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ARTICLES
The Supreme Court and Affirmative
Action: Whose Classification Is
Suspect?
By DONALD E. LIVELY*
Racial politics were central to the republic's founding and have
evolved apace with the nation's development. Two centuries ago the
Constitution was drafted and ratified in terms that countenanced racial
inequality. At least ten provisions' in the document owe their presence
to the imperatives of slavery. The effective denomination of whites as
persons and blacks as property, and consequent extension of rights and
freedoms along racial lines, reflected a calculated sense of the terms and
conditions necessary to ensure ratification.2 A century later, shortly after
amendments prohibiting slavery3 and guaranteeing equal protection4 and
the lapse of Reconstruction, the Supreme Court expressed antagonism
toward persisting efforts to remedy racial disadvantage. It thus declared
that the time had come when former slaves must "take[ ] the rank of a
* Professor, College of Law, University of Toledo; J.D., University of California, Los
Angeles; M.S., Northwestern University; A.B., University of California, Berkeley.
1. The Constitution has been identified as directly or indirectly accommodating the in-
terests of slavery by: (1) apportioning federal representation upon the premise that slaves con-
stituted three-fifths of a person, U.S. CONST. art I. § 2; (2) calibrating federal taxation in a like
mode, U.S. CONST. art I. §§ 2, 9; (3) authorizing Congress to activate state militias to sup-
press domestic insurrection, U.S. CONST. art. I § 8; (4) prohibiting Congress from terminating
the slave trade prior to 1808, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9; (5) barring federal and state taxation of
exports that might have included products of slave labor, U.S. CONST. art. I §§ 9, 10; (6)
denying states the power to liberate fugitive slaves, U.S. CoNST. art. IV § 2; (7) requiring the
federal government to protect states against domestic violence, U.S. CONST. art. IV § 4; and
(8) excluding from the amendment process provisions for continuation of the slave trade and
tax apportionment, U.S. CONST. art. V. See W. WJECEK, SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSnT-
TUTIONALISM IN AMERICA: 1760-1848, at 62-63 (1977).
2. Concessions to slave states represented the currency of exchange for securing the con-
stitution's ratification and ending the political and economic chaos characterizing the post-
Revolutionary era. See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 29-30 (1980).
3. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIII.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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mere citizen,... cease[ ] to be the special favorite of the law... [and] be
protected in the ordinary mode by which other men's rights are to be
protected."5 Emphasis upon racial neutrality, rather than special consid-
eration, was followed by several decades of overt racial politics yielding
official segregation and inequality as societal norms.6
Not until the mid-1960s, after the Court had determined that
"[s]eparate [was] ... inherently unequal,"7 did comprehensive federal
civil rights legislation attempt to secure voting rights,' facilitate desegre-
gation of public schools,9 accommodations, and facilities,10 and prohibit
discrimination in the workplace."1 Later, as a means of rectifying the
continuing fallout from societal discrimination, Congress established ra-
cial preferences in federal contracting and hiring.12 A decade ago the
Court approved limited use of race-conscious remediation. 13 Since then,
tae concept of affirmative action has operated on tenuous constitutional
footing subject to claims that preferences victimize their intended benefi-
ciaries" and innocent persons15 and may create limitless preserves.1
6
Individually and collectively, the arguments against race-conscious
remediation comport with a pattern of equal protection analysis that con-
sistently has served majoritarian inclinations. 7 Contributing further to
the impression that equal protection speaks to minority interests largely
in rhetorical terms is the Court's recent insistence upon color blindness,
in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 8 at a time when it coincides most
neatly with the dominant culture's convenience.
5. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
6. Courts applied the separate but equal doctrine, which openly deferred to concepts and
customs of racial superiority, for 58 years of the Fourteenth Amendment's 122 years of exist-
ence. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
8. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973dd-6.
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6(d).
10. Id., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000b-3.
11. Id., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-2(j).
12. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701, 6705.
13. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978); id at 326
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987).
14. Race-based preferences have been criticized for perpetuating negative stereotypes and
thus stigmatizing beneficiaries of remediation. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986).
16. Id.
17. See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
18. 109 S. Ct. 706, 721, 724 (1989) (racial classifications are suspect whether denominated
as burdensome or remedial); id. at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring) (race an unconstitutional con-
sideration for official action under any circumstance).
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Espousal of that standard was accompanied not only by recital of
familiar arguments against affirmative action but also by the notion that
race-conscious remediation presents unacceptable risks of political divi-
siveness along racial lines.' 9 Consistent with that pitch, the Court ob-
served that societal discrimination alone, if a reference point for racial
preferences, would encourage limitless claims by every disadvantaged
group to the point that the "dream of... a society where race is irrele-
vant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic
of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past
wrongs."
20
Holding an essentially reactive variant of race consciousness respon-
sible for impeding or disrupting an ideal already long deferred would be
remarkable but for the analytical consistency it betrays. Despite varying
standards over the course of its history, equal protection invariably has
been a function of majoritarian preference. The Fourteenth Amendment
was originally understood to be centrally concerned with securing and
facilitating racial equity.21 Nonetheless, it soon countenanced the sepa-
rate but equal doctrine and became noteworthy as a source of economic
liberty benefitting the privileged rather than the disadvantaged.2 2 Rights
of privacy and individual autonomy later were glossed upon the Amend-
ment 23 but eventually were cramped in a way that denied their full avail-
ability to equal protection's intended and most obvious beneficiaries.24
Even the desegregation mandate was cautiously introduced,25 eventually
19. Id at 727.
20. Id
21. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) (equal protection "clearly
a provision" concerned with "action of a state... directed by way of discrimination against
negroes as a class, or on account of their race.").
22. See, eg., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (contractual liberty interposed to
defeat state regulation of working conditions). The Lochner era of substantive due process
review persisted until 1937. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (even if
legislative wisdom debatable Court may not supersede its judgment).
23. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (liberty to elect an abortion); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy concerning intimate sexual matters).
24. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (restrictions upon federal funding of abor-
tions upheld although impacting poor black women most heavily); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S: 464
(1977) (restrictions upon state funding of abortions upheld although impacting poor black
women most heavily).
25. Recognizing the incendiary potential of its decree, the Court delayed its desegregation
order for a year and couched it in terms of "all deliberate speed." Brown v. Board of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). What followed for much of the next decade was widespread evasion,
delay and tokenism. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 863
(5th Cir. 1966) (minimal constitutional progress was the result of official stalling and bad faith
facilitated by lower courts), corrected, 380 F.2d 385 (5h Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840
(1967).
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eviscerated, and disabled in large part so that it did not reach so-called de
facto segregation.26 Since then, discriminatory purpose has become a
general prerequisite for establishing any institutional claim of official
discrimination.27
If a competition were conducted to determine the most effective
means for paying tribute to minority interests in word but not deed, it is
doubtful that any methodology would surpass the discriminatory pur-
pose standard. Incorporation of an intent requirement has proved vexing
because it impairs vitalization of minority concerns, services
majoritarian convenience almost invariably, and is effectively criticized
in other constitutional contexts even by those who embrace it for equal
protection purposes.28 Illegal purpose may be disguised by racially neu-
tral reasons.29 When officials are on notice that they must conceal illicit
motive to avoid constitutional consequences, searching for wrongful in-
tent becomes an exercise well-known for its futility.30 Collective intent
generally is an illusion.3 Motive-based inquiry essentially transforms
equal protection into a guarantee against overt discrimination. Because
obviously burdensome classifications are largely obsolete and can be ad-
dressed without resorting to strict scrutiny,32 modem equal protection is
26. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1971) (conditioning duty to desegre-
gate upon proof of segregative purpose). The line between de jure and de facto segregation
seems more political than logical. Residential segregation, resulting from restrictive covenants
enforced by the courts, federal lending policies denying home financing that would contribute
to racially mixed neighborhoods, and official decisions concerning the siting of public housing
and distribution of urban development funds, is deeply rooted in discriminatory purpose. In-
sofar as the result is not considered a product of official design, however, no duty to remedy it
exists.
27. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (capital punishment); Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (housing); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (employment).
28. Inquiry into illicit motive has been criticized in multiple constitutional contexts. See,
e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (freedom of speech); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Establishment Clause). Justice
Rehnquist has remained a proponent of such review for equal protection purposes despite
identifying its defects in another setting. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662, 702-03 (1981) (Relmquist, J., dissenting) (state police power in relationship to federal
commerce power).
29. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection; Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rnv. 317, 319 (1987).
30. Id.
31. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383-84; Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. at
636-37 (Sca, J., dissenting).
32. If it is assumed that exclusionary racial classifications serve no rational purpose, they
can be invalidated pursuant to the most deferential level of judicial review that asks whether
government action is supported by any conceivable basis. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955). Such an assumption seems implicit in the Court's holdings
that at most have mustered plurality support for segregation under extreme circumstances.
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pertinent and currently effective as a means of defeating race-conscious
remediation. Discrete instances of discrimination, if proved, may be sub-
ject to remediation,33 but contemporary motive-focused standards make
that possibility more theoretical than real. Pursuant to invigorated no-
tions of color blindness, the broader realities and legacies of societal dis-
crimination cannot even be factored into policies of redress.
34
Given principles establishing an absolute barrier and nearly insur-
mountable obstacle, the bottom line suggests that the equal protection
revolution that displaced the separate but equal doctrine has been almost
fully eclipsed by a counterinsurgency reasserting majoritarian conven-
tions. Attributing the possibility of political tribalism to general
remediation moves the Court into a new phase of evading or rational-
izing actual cause and effect that differs from its analytical antecedents
only in time and form. By removing race as a factor in remediating ra-
cial problems, however, the Court has discounted the consequences of a
politico-economic system consciously founded and maintained upon ra-
cial considerations and inequality. Because specific cause, nature, and
effect of a problem are legitimate reference points for legislatively con-
fronting any other issue, the Court has now created an exclusionary clas-
sification that is pernicious and itself a basis for suspect status.
Given a backdrop in which race has insinuated itself so deeply into
both public policy and private decisions, dismissal of remedial initiatives
on grounds they engender racial divisiveness seems Orwellian. The re-
sult is a twist on Justice Stewart's famous comment to the effect that he
knew obscenity when he saw it.35 The Court may be able to see a legacy
of racial inequality but does not want to know about it. The purpose of
this Article is: (1) to examine the Court's recent pronouncements on
affirmative action as a part of a continuing heritage of majoritarian-sensi-
tive equal protection review; (2) to show that the affirmative promotion
of equal protection values is not as alien a constitutional concept as the
See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, Harlan, & Stewart, JJ., concurring)
(constitutionality of segregation to ensure prison security under racially tense circumstances).
33. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 727-28 (1989).
34. The Court, however, has allowed congressionally mandated preferential policies to the
extent they promote an "important governmental objective" and "are substantially related to
the achievement of that objective." Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 58 U.S.L.W. 5053, 5058
(June 26, 1990). Rules designed to facilitate minority ownership in broadcasting, by awarding
preferences in the licensing process, thus were upheld because "they serve the important gov-
ernmental interest of broadcast diversity." Id Review of the policies reflected "deference...
in light of Congress' institutional competence as the national legislature,.. . as well as Con-
gress' powers under the Commerce Clause,... the Spending Clause, . . . and the Civil War
Amendments." Id. at 5057.
35. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Court suggests; and (3) to demonstrate that the case against affirmative
action, far from promoting color blindness, actually introduces an invidi-
ous racial classification that makes the political process even less respon-
sive to minority interests.
I. Affirmative Action as an Endangered Constitutional Species
Mounting judicial antagonism toward race-conscious remediation
manifests itself simultaneously with the Court's observation that
"[n]either our words nor our decisions should be interpreted as signaling
one inch of retreat from. .. forbidding discrimination in the private as
well as the public sphere."36 Standards of racial neutrality viewed at a
glance might seem congruent with such a characterization. At least
three Justices have been moved, however, to "wonder whether the major-
ity still believes that racial discrimination-or more accurately, race dis-
crimination against nonwhites-is a problem in our society, or even
remembers that it ever was."
'37
The notion of a color-blind constitution surfaced originally in Jus-
tice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.38 Harlan, criticizing the
Court's investment in the separate but equal doctrine, maintained that
"[o]ur Constitution is color blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens.",39 Despite rhetorical similarities, contemporary articu-
lations of hostility toward race-conscious remediation have no certain
linkage to Harlan's doctrinal rendition. Harlan found official segregation
repulsive because it represented the dominant culture's manipulation of
the law to advantage itself at the expense of minorities.' Objection to
policies that were overtly exclusionary do not translate automatically
into intolerance of remediation which, albeit color sensitive, has inclu-
sionary aims.
Given the history preceding it and the setting in which it arises,
color blindness as a constitutional standard for all seasons does not merit
uncritical evaluation. Remediation keyed toward redressing the general
reality of societal discrimination is a logical option insofar as motive-
dependent criteria have relegated indisputable realities of discrimination
and prejudice beyond the legal system's perceptual and cognitive capac-
ity. A focus upon societal discrimination and the sweeping methodology
36. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2379 (1989).
37. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2136 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
38. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
40. Id at 563-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
it implies, however, has been dismissed as "too amorphous."41 It is in
response to initiatives conceived to account for the broad legacy of racial
injustice, therefore, that strict racial neutrality is being emphasized. In
City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Company42 the Court summarized its
objections to remediation when not employed to fix theoretically prova-
ble instances of past discrimination. It thus expressed concern that ra-
cially preferential policies would: (1) lead to special preserves for
minorities; (2) even if well-intended, demean and reinforce negative ste-
reotypes; (3) promote rather than defeat color consciousness; (4) make
the legislative process hostage to racial politics.43
Racial favoritism, no matter how lofty its aim, has the potential to
be harmful in its application. A preferential scheme, that essentially
tracks whites and blacks into slots reminiscent of a plantation economy,
might be benign in depiction but genuinely invidious in its effect upon
minority interests. Another potentially questionable policy might be a
preferential scheme formulated in a jurisdiction where a national minor-
ity traditionally had been the dominant political force. Favoritism in
such a context might require judicial appraisal to determine whether a
uniquely local advantage was being constitutionally abused.'
Despite the possibilities for abuse of color-conscious schemes, objec-
tions to remediation are unpersuasive and even troubling to the extent
they are expressed in categorical terms. Concern that preferences will
convert into enduring rather than temporary preserves probably is exag-
gerated because equal protection consistently has been reducible to terms
and consequences of majoritarian suffrance,45 and any self-burdening
policies are likely to remain responsive to self-interest. Fear that negative
stereotypes will be promoted also seems misplaced, especially to the ex-
tent experience and performance eventually supersede perceptions of
preferential beneficiaries as less qualified. A fixation upon short-term
consequences that are an inevitable result of any significant change un-
necessarily sacrifices more profound long-term interests. Furthermore,
worries about stigmatization tend to be overstated. Successful white
males have been advantaged by not having to compete against a full line-
up. They bear a stigma, attributable to the traditional exclusion of i-
41. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986).
42. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
43. Id. at 721.
44. The Court's invalidation of a municipality's set-aside scheme for contracting referred
to a national minority's dominant numbers in the particular jurisdiction. Id at 722. Such a
reality might justify a careful examination of the program but should be regarded as a possible
rather than a certain source of abuse.
45. See supra notes 1-5, 21-34 and accompanying text.
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norities and women, that affirmative action actually might help erase.
Stereotyping flowing from deeply ingrained attitudes predating any con-
cept of affirmative action will persist with or without remedial initiatives.
Selective reference to affirmative action as a barrier to broadly conceived
remediation disregards the real sources and nature of inequality. The
mentality is reminiscent of insensitivity to unequal bargaining power
when contractual liberty was identified as the paramount concern of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In a society functionally disposed toward race-dependent judgment
and, until recently, countenancing overt legal distinctions too, it seems
impertinent to hold affirmative action to a high level of accountability for
continuing race consciousness. Even more preposterous is the notion
that color-calibrated remediation would be responsible for injecting Tace
into the political process. From the time the Constitution was drafted
and slavery was negotiated as the price for ratification, constitutional,
statutory, and common law have been functions of racial politics." No
other influence explains official segregation or even contemporary voting
patterns reflecting dominant racial considerations.47  Fretting that
remediation to correct societal discrimination would sacrifice "[t]he
dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrele-
vant" 48 expresses anxiety over a reality already well-established. Forbid-
dance of the racial politics of remediation from a process already noted
for historical exclusion and underrepresentation-the very conditions
which originally justified strict scrutiny49 -effectively creates a classifica-
tion of the most traditional and suspect order. The inexplicable net con-
sequence is that racial politics may proceed in customary fashion but not
in a way that has more positive consequences for minority interests.
While holding preferential policies to a more exacting standard, the
Court simultaneously has destabilized foundations for existing and ap-
proved affirmative action plans. To correct identifiable discriminatory
practices, consent decrees commonly are used to impose contractual re-
medial obligations backed by the judiciary. Although negotiated, such
decrees originate from adversarial litigation and have the effect of a judg-
ment.50 When Birmingham, Alabama entered into a consent decree with
black firefighters and the NAACP, it did so in an effort to redress a long
46. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
47. Voting patterns still evince racial preference as a dominant influence, especially
among whites. See Detroit Free Press, Oct. 22, 1958 § 1, at 1, cols. 1-2.
48. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 727 (1989).
49. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
50. See Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2190 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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history of departmental discrimination in hiring and promotion. 1 The
order was implemented pursuant to a hearing that included arguments
by the city firefighters' association in opposition to the plan.52 Following
actual entry of the decree, several white firefighters sued the city on
grounds that promotion practices pursuant to the consent decree dis-
criminated against them. 3
In Martin v. Wilks,54 the Court strictly construed procedural rules
in declaring that the affirmative action plan could be challenged by non-
parties to the original litigation. As the dissent noted, however, the effect
of the decree did not and could not deprive persons of their legally pro-
tected contractual rights.55 Attention to procedural imperatives does not
explain why a decree may not structure employment conditions in a way
that conditions hiring and promotion prospects. Defining or delimiting
terms of entry or advancement is not necessarily synonymous with depri-
vation of legal rights. 6
The Martin decision, if representing an invitation to challenge estab-
lished affirmative action plans, evinces a selective license to disrupt the
interests of finality. Although conclusiveness of result is discounted in
the affirmative action area, it is precisely the rationale constantly empha-
sized in the criminal justice context to deny postconviction relief even
when a compelling claim can be made that a constitutional right has been
denied.5 Common to the respective slackening and hardening of general
rules is a visible lack of sympathy for affirmative action -and for criminal
defendants. Since the Birmingham plan had been contested by disaf-
fected employees,58 the Court's decision particularly intimates a calcu-
lated interest in destabilizing the entire concept of affirmative action. At
a minimum, the holding brings uncertainty and vulnerability to judicially
enforced affirmative action. A consent decree, even if entered into in
good faith and with a recognition that liability would result if the case
were tried, will not shield an employer from competing race-based litiga-
51. Id. at 2183.
52. Id
53. Id
54. Id. at 2185-88.
55. Id at 2188-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id at 2189 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Eg., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) (emphasizing the importance of
perception that a criminal trial "in state court [is] a decisive and portentous event"); Reed v.
Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 26 n.3 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that "orderly administra-
tion of justice and concerns of finality... have significance for the allocation of societal re-
sources, ... distribution of those resources ... and ultimately, what justice remains to be
dispensed").
58, See Wilks, 109 S. Ct. at 2191.
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tion.5 9 The consequent prospect is that resolution of one set of discrimi-
nation claims may cause exposure to another set of claims." Such
complications and the resultant chilling effect upon employers are diffi-
cult to reconcile with abiding imperatives of equal protection and associ-
ated policies.
Depreciation of remediation pitched toward societal discrimination
seems disingenuous given the construction of doctrine that blunts identi-
fication of discrimination on virtually all significant fronts of contempo-
rary society. Redress has been proposed in such broad terms because
demonstration and correction of discrete instances of wrongdoing have
been so seriously confounded. Jurisprudential impediments couched in
terms of constitutional mandate, when pierced to their essential nature,
reveal dominant and persisting values that continue to inspire equal pro-
tection thinking and results. The enduring influence of majoritarian pref-
erence in delineating constitutional perimeters is paralleled and
reinforced by increasingly cramped readings of both statute61 and proce-
dure. 2 The net consequence is a definition of equal protection and re-
lated policies that consistently disables concepts that would truly
remediate. Redress of the legacy and reality of racial injustice thus be-
comes a function of what does not offend the majority, which necessarily
is ineffective and renders equal protection largely powerless.
II. Affirmative Action as a Constitutional Norm
Affirmative action as a means of remediating racial discrimination
ignites controversy that surpasses the concept's divisive potential in the
abstract or in other contexts. Although invariably controverted when
actually propounded, the concept of promoting constitutional values is
hardly novel. Because the Constitution is not self-defining, its animation
requires the grafting of principles effectuating selected values. Given a
constitution that does not speak for itself, except to the extent it utters
several precise, discrete, and uncontroverted commands,63 and justices
who cannot truly hear voices originating from within the four corners of
59. See id. at 2199-2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 2198-2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. E.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2372-73 (1989) (holding
that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits discrimination in the formation of contracts but does not cover
postformation harassment).
62. E.g., Martin, 109 S. Ct. 2180, discussed supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
63. Age restriction upon candidates for federal office exemplifies an explicit constitutional
prescription that is indisputable with respect to its meaning. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3
and art. II, § 1, cl. 5. They contrast with the open-ended terminology of fundamental guaran-
tees set forth in the Bill of Rights and subsequent amendments including the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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the charter itself, the principles begetting fundamental law are chosen
from competing societal values. The documental actuation process is
routine even if the choice of values and consequent embellishment of the
Constitution is not preordained.
The promotion of equal protection values in the name of affirmative
action is not the first time that constitutional interests have been ordered
and facilitated. The exclusionary rule was designed to promote fourth
amendment interests,' and Miranda warnings were formulated to facili-
tate fifth and sixth amendment concerns.65 Desegregation and concomi-
tant remediation, including busing plans, were calculated to further equal
protection values.66 The Voting Rights Act was adopted to advance fif-
teenth amendment goals.67
Affirmative schemes for redressing racial discrimination even in
broad societal terms are not unique insofar as they may assign or reallo-
cate burdens. Modem technological and economic forces and conse-
quent concern with the media's pervasive nature, for instance, have
engendered a restructuring of first amendment rights. The public's inter-
est in receiving diverse viewpoints has been identified as a constitutional
priority particularly when mass communication is limited to a relative
few.6" Having been glossed onto the First Amendment, the public's right
has been declared paramount to the traditional constitutional interests of
broadcasters in editorial autonomy.69 Content regulation, including the
fairness doctrine, has been justified pursuant to that "unusual order" of
first amendment rights.7"
64. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) ("sanction of exclusion" a means of
effectuating fourth amendment guarantees).
65. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (procedural safeguards in the form of
warnings prior to custodial interrogation required to utilize privileges against self-
incrimination).
66. See Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971) (affirmative
steps required to "desegregat[e] a state-enforced dual system in light of the Equal Protection
Clause").
67. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (civil rights legislation
designed to work "against voting discrimination").
68. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969).
69. See id (recognizing public's paramount first amendment right of suitable access to
diverse views and voices).
70. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973) (reaffirming public's over-
arching first amendment interests in diverse programming but denying general right of access).
Despite the FCC's recent abandonment of the fairness doctrine, the notion that the public's
first amendment interests are paramount endures. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Red.
5043, 5055-57 (1987) (abandoning fairness doctrine and thereby elevating first amendment
status of broadcasters but nonetheless adverting to public's paramount first amendment
rights), aff'd, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The Commis-
SDfin 1990] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
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It is ironic that formalized minority preferences engender so much
dispute when other promotive policies resting upon less stable footing
seem to have been better tolerated. Unlike principles calculated to pro-
mote first amendment values, federal affirmative action plans designed to
remedy past wrongs to minorities are tied to specific constitutional lan-
guage enabling the federal government at least to promote fourteenth
amendment interests.71 To the extent such policies are formulated by
democratic entities normatively responsive to majoritarian interests, fa-
cilitation of minority concerns should be less worrisome. Legislatures
and unions, for instance, tend to be repositories of majoritarian senti-
ment. For affirmative action to become enacted or adopted, therefore, it
must transcend whatever prejudice, irrationality, disinterest, or other
majoritarian sentiment that may be institutionally present. Review of
any plans emerging from such circumstances reasonably could be con-
fined to determining whether procedures responsible for a preferential
scheme were fair and any consequent harm was inimical to long-term
equal protection objectives.72
The separate but equal doctrine, constitutionally enshrined in Plessy
v. Ferguson,73 represented the affirmative promotion of majoritarian val-
ues, customs, and comfort. The formula as constructed and interpreted
was an assertive methodology for protecting a dominant class.74 It also
formalized classification schemes that stigmatized blacks and perpetu-
ated stereotypes. 5 Official segregation was subject to the feeble demand
that any exercise of state police power creating a racial classification had
to be reasonable.76 Unlike modem equal protection analysis when dis-
criminatory intent is present,77 review of official racial classification was
deferential rather than heightened.78 Racial classification schemes rarely
sion merely has determined that those concerns are better served by marketplace forces rather
than regulatory controls. 2 F.C.C. Rd. at 5057.
71. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5.
72. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 317 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
74. See id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting the existence "in some of the States, [of]
a dominant race-a superior class of citizens, which assumes to regulate... civil rights...
upon the basis of race"). The legacy of Plessy includes a series of cases that supported racial
separation and heavily discounted the equality element of the doctrine. In Cumming v. Geor-
gia, 175 U.S. 528, 542 (1899), for instance, a school board was allowed to deny high school
education to blacks even though such schooling was provided to whites.
75. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arbitrary separation on basis of race
imposes a "brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of fellow citizens").
76. Id. at 550.
77. Upon proof of discriminatory intent, judicial review becomes strict. See, eg., Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-41 (1976); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208
(1973).
78. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550 (standard of review was mere reasonableness).
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failed to pass constitutional muster whether motivated by morally under-
developed notions of promoting public harmony79 or by more overtly
oppressive and supremacist instincts.8 0 As the legacy of Plessy v. Fergu-
son demonstrated, concern for separateness was genuine but commitment
to equality was not. 8' Consequently, the naked servicing of majority con-
venience at the expense of minority interests begot the longest running
affirmative action scheme in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court's conclusion in 1954 that separate inherently
was unequal 2 introduced doctrine and standards that largely have come
to accommodate rather than displace majoritarian impulses. Affirmative
remedial schemes were implicit in the new constitutional alignment inso-
far as busing proved necessary to effectuate desegregation. 3 Restrictions
upon the use of busing84 and the consequent collapse of the desegregation
mandate are instructive in responding to the modern concern that affirm-
ative action plans may be limitless. Judicial intervention to ensure that
remediation does not operate beyond control reflects not only sensitivity
to majoritarian convenience but a reaction that is both excessive and un-
necessary. Concern that affirmative action causes injury significant
enough to merit close attention, because it advances unthinking stereo-
types, injures innocent whites, and is potentially limitless, 5 is exagger-
ated because such remedial schemes target a highly discrete subcategory
of persons and are subject to profound, if not always perceived, limita-
tions. In the employment context, affirmative action policies often bene-
fit those individuals already possessing certifiable qualifications such as a
79. See id (reasonableness of legislation referenced to "established usages, customs and
traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preserva-
tion of the public peace and good order").
80. Antimiscegenation laws were intended to maintain "white supremacy" and remained
undisturbed until the late 1960s. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
81. Not until 1938 did the Court actually find inequality present in a segregated educa-
tional setting. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). Even so, the deter-
mination was not made until the disparity, created by the absence of any black law school, was
so egregious that it could not be ignored. "[A]t the university level, no provision for Negro
education was a rule rather than an exception." Marshall, An Evaluation of Recent Efforts to
Achieve Racial Integration in Education through Resort to the Courts, 21 J. NEGRO EDuC. 316,
319 (1952).
82. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
83. See Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 18 (1971) (bus transpor-
tation for students one of several remedies that may be required for "eliminat[ing] invidious
racial discrimination in public schools").
84. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (invalidating metropolitan desegregation
plan absent satisfactory showing of discriminatory intent by suburban school districts).
85. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 721 (1989).
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skill or a degree.86 Quite the opposite from being infinite in scope or
duration, race-conscious hiring plans tend to be constrained too by
majoritarian attitudes and values governing their operation. Conscious
policies to hire minorities to enhance diversity may be circumscribed ab-
ruptly once a certain level of diversification is reached.87 Even exception-
ally qualified minority applicants subsequently may be rejected pursuant
to a dominant sense that the institution has accomplished its diversifica-
tion objectives or to an altered definition of merit.88
Whether precisely tied to provable instances of specific wrong or
more generally to societal discrimination, it is difficult to envision how
any initiative dependent upon the dominant culture's acquiescence is
likely to be limitless. Coursing of policy to secure voting rights typifies
the resilience of majoritarian impulses that subject any minority-con-
scious scheme to constant jeopardy. The Voting Rights Act of 196589
essentially represented an affirmative action methodology designed to
protect the franchise from denial or dilution by race-conscious schemes.
Standards governing political gerrymandering unrelated to race evolved
toward prohibiting substantial deviations in equality among districts re-
gardless of intent.90 Districting plans challenged on grounds that they
diminished minority voting power, however, became captive to discrimi-
natory intent criteria.91 The Court's analytical framework then, as in the
affirmative action context now, essentially created an exclusionary racial
classification of the most traditionally suspect nature. Although Con-
gress amended the law so that effect rather than purpose was the opera-
86. Affirmative action plans as contemporaneously conceived focus upon a relatively
small and elite proportion of minorities who are well-educated or possess certain acquired and
certifiable skills. See W. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE 120 (1978).
87. So-called tipping points have been referred to as a basis for denying educational and
housing opportunities to blacks pursuant to concern that their presence beyond a certain
number would drive away whites and defeat integration aims. See Riddick v. School Bd. of
Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 525 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986); Otero v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1140 (2d Cir. 1973).
88. Some prestigious schools have been accused, for instance, of operating a functional
quota system that denies admission to Asian-American students whose grades and test scores
suggest they are exceptionally well-qualified pursuant to traditional criteria of merit. See Do
Colleges Set Asian Quotas? NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1987, at 60.
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973dd-6.
90. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1968) (county commission
elected from single member districts unconstitutional because of gross overrepresentation of
rural and underrepresentation of urban areas).
91. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion) (discrimina-
tory purpose required to establish violation of Fifteenth Amendment, but illicit motive not
established in this case); id. at 103 (White, J., dissenting) (discriminatory purpose required and
established).
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tive standard,92 the Justice Department persisted in asserting that
wrongful purpose must be proved. 93 The Court eventually determined
that discriminatory intent was not required to establish a violation of the
Voting Rights Act.94 In so doing, however, it responded not only to the
claims of minorities but also to Republicans who stood to benefit from
changes in the apportionment scheme at issue and thus had joined the
litigation.95
History discloses that affirmative action is a common methodology
for facilitating constitutional concerns. Its availability and utility appear
to be a function, however, of race-dependent considerations.
I. Color Blindness as an Invidious Classification:
Reburdening the Political Process
Equal protection at its inception was recognized "clearly [as] a pro-
vision" concerned with racial discrimination.96 Within a few decades the
Court turned a deferential if not blind eye toward official segregation. 97
While equal protection was dismissed as the "last resort of constitutional
arguments," 98 the Fourteenth Amendment in general had been con-
verted into a vehicle for effectuating concepts of marketplace liberty.99
The eventual demise of economic liberty was coupled with the intimation
that judicial attention still would be enhanced for matters concerning
"discrete and insular minorities. ' '"" ° Several years later, the Court con-
cluded that policies "curtail[ing] the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect [and] ... must [be] subject.., to the most rigid
scrutiny." ' The concept of suspectness eventually led to invalidation of
official segregation. 2 However, the Court ultimately diminished the
principle's significance by directing equal protection toward concern with
the purpose rather than the consequences of policy.10 3 To the extent
92. Voting Rights Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
93. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 61-62 (1986) (asserting that intent and other fac-
tors must be proved).
94. Id at 62, 70-74 (need not prove "discriminatory intent in order to prove prima facie
case").
95. See Cooper, Beware of Republicans Bearing Voting Rights Suits, THE WASHINGTON
MONTHLY, Feb. 1987, at 11-15.
96. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
97. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
98. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
99. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
100. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
101. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
102. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (separate inherently unequal).
103. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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equal protection has been constrained so that it accounts for little beyond
overt discrimination, which could be found irrational pursuant to the
most deferential standard of review, 1°4 the notion of strict scrutiny has
become largely irrelevant. Jurisprudential trends disfavoring affirmative
action thus appear to fit a broader doctrinal pattern undercutting the
utility of equal protection as a means of accounting meaningfully for
race-based disadvantage.
Viewed in such a context, the notion that color-conscious remedia-
tion holds the political process hostage to tribal politics"0 5 seems espe-
cially double-minded. History discloses that race has been a dominant
and constant factor in American politics to the special detriment of mi-
norities. The dominant culture was responsible not only for slavery, offi-
cial segregation, and resistance to desegregation, but also for voting
behavior that continues to nominate and select persons for public office
on the basis of race. Despite contemporary breakthroughs in electing
blacks to offices heretofore occupied exclusively by whites, electoral pat-
terns continue to reveal racial allegiance especially on the part of
whites.106 Interest groups reflecting racial concerns are less a cause than
a consequence of enduring racial politics. Holding affirmative action re-
sponsible for jeopardizing the ideal of a society in which race is irrele-
vant 0 7 at best is myopic. At worst, it sacrifices broad-based remediation
to a vision that is more rhetorical than substantive and derogated by a
long record of official and private action. Considerations and conces-
sions made during the Constitution's drafting and ratification ensured
the relevance of race at the republic's commencement. Policies formu-
lated by all branches of government since have reinforced the pertinence
of race and, coupled with attitudes of racial superiority, fashioned a leg-
acy of majoritarian advantage. Racial dissonance endures not as a func-
tion of remedial effect but of original cause.
The singling-out of race as an impermissible reference point for
remediation constructs a classification that excludes in the most tradi-
tional manner and thus possesses the most suspect striping imaginable.
The legislative process in a representative, pluralistic society contem-
plates the factoring in and balancing of concerns pertinent to assorted
groups. It further anticipates and is activated by coalitions operating to
enable minorities to effectuate their interests. By foreclosing race as a
reference point for problems of race, the Court selectively denies minori-
104. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
105. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 721-22 (1989).
106. See Detroit Free Press, Oct. 22, 1989, § 1, at 1, cols. 1-2.
107. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. at 727.
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ties an avenue normally available for addressing other issues. The polit-
ical process previously was pried open pursuant to the recognition that it
underrepresented discrete and insular minorities. 08 Jurisprudence now
reburdens the political process in the name of color blindness. The re-
sulting inversion is consonant with a social order premised upon Justice
Scalia's observation that "victims" of affirmative action are outcasts of
the legislative process and "politically impotent. ' ' 1°9 Given a culture still
disposed to race-dependent judgment and ways, a judicially prescribed
classification excluding race consciousness in the interest of racial neu-
trality redounds again to the service of majoritarian convenience.
Foreclosure of race-sensitive remediation as a means of transcending
race" 0 makes even more imperative the need for standards that are sensi-
tive and responsive to traditional forms of discrimination. If color blind-
ness is to be the dominant constitutional standard, broad effectuation of
its purpose necessitates departure from criteria that have minimal utility
except for servicing majoritarian inclinations. A focus upon discrimina-
tory purpose, although useful as a means of sheltering dominant priori-
ties, has little if any relevance to the consequences of official policy in the
real world. If constitutional principles are made more pertinent to their
purported concern, it may be appropriate for the Court to cast analysis
that more directly confronts legislative actions and policies. A useful
model would be thirteenth amendment jurisprudence, which considers
whether challenged actions and their effects can be interpreted as inci-
dents or badges of slavery."' 1 With only a slight change to make the
formula more pertinent to modem times, appraisal of official action
might focus upon whether the policy or action at issue was a function of
racism.
Pursuant to such a criterion, the Court would have to sensitize itself
to the realities and imageries of racism it seems inclined to avoid. Such a
responsibility may be problematical because it does not always evince an
awareness or appreciation of the nature and implications of cultural plu-
108. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (discussing
hallmarks of suspectness for equal protection purposes); United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1983) (formative identification of interests and conditions meriting
enhanced judicial attention).
109. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun,
J., concurring and dissenting) ("In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race").
111. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (discrimination interfering
with right to own property a badge and incident of slavery). See also Lawrence, supra note 29,
at 349-55.
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ralism.112 Justice Kennedy, in another context, candidly acknowledged
he did not know the significance of an important symbol for a prominent
religious minority. 11 3 Such cultural deficiency, to the extent com-
pounded by standards that do not cut to the heart of controversies, how-
ever, actually may be an argument for such confrontational inquiry.
Review that forces the Court to focus upon racism and its consequences
in a more direct way might have a healthy educational effect and
heighten the Court's awareness of the need for more forceful doctrine.
So far, efforts to engage the Court in a more direct inquiry have been
unproductive. A Southern city's street closure, which insulated a white
neighborhood from traffic into and out of a black neighborhood, 1 4 was
challenged as a badge and incident of slavery but held a legitimate means
of preserving residential tranquility." 5 Instead of settling for a plausible
racially neutral reason, allowing review to devolve to the level of mere
rationality, the challenged practice could have been required to satisfy
two demands. First, it would have been necessary for the state to provide
justification that was compelling and convincing and not merely neutral.
Second, even in the event of a strong reason, the Court would have had
to balance it against possible perceptions of an incident or badge of ra-
cism and determine which harm was greater.
Because good reason exists to lack confidence in the Court's capac-
ity to sensitively and directly confront the realities and implicatiofis of
racism, or to place itself at odds with mainstream values and customs, a
more promising option may require broadening the focus of remediation.
Although the Court increasingly has foreclosed opportunities for race-
conscious remediation, it has established a body of law that creates a
clear opportunity for redressing general disadvantage that incidentally
would include consequences of racial discrimination. The constitutional
viability of broadly conceived racially neutral programs ironically has
been established by jurisprudence that curbed the reach of equal protec-
tion. Claims concerning disparities in or unavailability of public funding
respectively for education 1 6 and abortion" 7 were rejected on grounds
112. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 776-77 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (deci-
sion upholding regulation of indecent expression reflects "depressing inability to" appreciate
implications of cultural pluralism).
113. City of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3146 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(expressing unfamiliarity with significance of menorah to Jewish faith).
114. Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
115. Id. at 127.
116. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (disparities in
funding and quality of education that are not the result of discriminatory intent are not strictly
scrutinized).
117. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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that wealth classifications were not suspect. Accordingly, policies struc-
tured to remediate disadvantage, including but transcending racial dis-
crimination, likewise should survive strict scrutiny and be subject to
deferential review. Justice Scalia, who has taken an absolute position
countenancing no racial classification whatsoever, has noted that prefer-
ential schemes having a racially disproportionate impact but not overtly
based on race would present no constitutional problem. 1 8 Resulting pol-
icy may be vulnerable to the criticism that neutrality merely is a disguise
for race consciousness. It is even conceivable that remediation would
survive judicial review by concealment of actual purpose and objective.
In reality, however, such a result might effectuate equal opportunity for
all types of racial classifications and argue persuasively for eliminating
motive-based inquiry altogether.
Conclusion
The Court's recent curtailment of abortion rights elicited Justice
Blackmun's observation that future prospects for that liberty interest
were "very ominous, and a chill wind blows.""1 9 Such a forecast seems
doubly pertinent to the future of affirmative action, given redaction of
societal discrimination as a permissible reference point for remediation
and the continuing operation of discriminatory intent as a standard for
discrete claims of constitutional wrongdoing. Dim prospects for race-
conscious policies should not be surprising, however, given the consistent
failure over the course of history to disentangle equal protection from
majoritarian impulses. More than a century's worth of fourteenth
amendment jurisprudence has demonstrated much judicial creativity in
the form of economic liberty, privacy rights, and concepts of personal
autonomy. Even those jurisprudential glosses have been structured, in
some instances, to exclude the primary beneficiaries of the core provision.
With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment's most obvious aim, the
Court's legacy consists primarily of the separate but equal doctrine fol-
lowed by motive-based inquiry and now color blindness.
Modem jurisprudence may be less hesitant to acknowledge and con-
demn racial injustice insofar as it constitutes a historical reality. Justice
Holmes responded to claims of mass disfranchisement of blacks with the
conclusion that judicial relief would be pointless given dominant local
118. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 738 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (remediation of discrimination permissible so long as beneficiaries not "identified on the
basis of their race") (emphasis in original).
119. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3079 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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attitudes responsible for the wrongs.1 20 More recent jurisprudence in-
cludes the observation that" a denial of constitutionally protected rights
demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of
us." 121 Like most of its antecedents, however, the Rehnquist Court
seems inclined to frustrate, at most points of inspiration, constitutional,
statutory, or procedural renditions that would effectively account for mi-
nority interests. Merely expressing regrets for the vices of forebears does
not diminish the Court's responsibility for crafting standards that accom-
modate an inherited order of racial advantage and reduce constitutional
obligations to the level of a procedural ritual.
Cramping the political system in a way that makes it less responsive
to racial grievances is the function of a classification process that burdens
minorities in the most traditionally suspect way. Introduction of color
blindness as a standard for all seasons may not be an unmitigated curse if
it shatters the illusion that the judiciary is a natural and dependable ally
of minorities. The Court's performance over the course of history dem-
onstrates that it is a miscalculation to expect the judiciary, functioning
within and primarily as a product of majoritarian convention, to stray
from majoritarian norms. Considered as a whole, the Court's equal pro-
tection record reveals a disinclination to intervene on behalf of minority
concerns unless the consequences prove acceptable to the majority. The
Court's recent renderings, insisting on racially neutral policies for all
purposes and blaming race-conscious remediation for political disso-
nance, merely extend a legacy of manipulated standards and rationales
suiting majoritarian convenience. Regardless of outcome, litigation may
serve a valuable educational purpose122 and judicial decisions may per-
form a critical catalytic function.1 23 The primary path toward further
minority progress, however, leads in the direction of coalition building.
Such a road remains open so long as the Court, which activated equal
protection when the political system was perceived as dysfunctional, does
not reburden the process as it responds more effectively to minority
concerns.
120. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1903) ("pointless" to order relief that state and
citizenry would disregard).
121. Reynold v. Sims,,377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
122. See D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 253-55 (1987).
123. Without the Court's intervention in 1954, and given a Senate held captive by Southern
filibusters and influence, it is unlikely that official racial barriers would have fallen as soon as
they did. Even so, due to the costs and reach of litigation and recalcitrant states and localities,
official segregation was not really erased until comprehensive civil rights legislation was en-
acted. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
